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Enterprises rely critically on the timely and sustained delivery of informa-
tion, supported by middleware that ensures high-availability for such information
flows. Our goal is to augment such middleware to create resilient information
flows that deliver information while maximizing the utility end user applications
derive from such information. Towards this end, this paper presents a ‘proactive
availability-management’ technique to offer (1) information flows that dynami-
cally self-determine their availability requirement based on high-level utility spec-
ifications, (2) flows that can trade recovery time for performance based on the ‘per-
ceived’ stability and failure predictions (early alarm) for the underlying system,
and (3) methods, based on real-world case studies, to deal with both transient and
non-transient failures. We have incorporated ‘proactive availability-management’
into information flow middleware, and experiments reported in this paper demon-
strate its capability to self-determine availability guarantees, to offer improved per-
formance over a statically configured system, and to be resilient to a wide-range of
faults.
1 Introduction
Modern enterprises rely critically on timely and sustained delivery of information. The
delivery of such information is often facilitated by distributed information flow mid-
dleware that acquires, manipulates, and disseminates information across the enterprise.
An important attribute of companies’ operational information systems is their avail-
ability - 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Systems failures can have dire consequences
for the enterprise, including loss of productivity, unhappy customers, or serious finan-
cial implications. In fact, the average cost of downtime for financial companies, as
reported in [18], is up to 6.5 million dollars per hour and hundreds of thousands of dol-
lars per hour for retail companies. This has resulted in strong demand for operational
information systems that are available almost continuously.
Providing high availability in widely distributed operational information systems
is complex for multiple reasons. First, because information flows are distributed, they
are difficult to manage, and failures at any of a number of distributed components can
reduce availability. Second, multiple flows may use the same distributed resources,
increasing the complexity of the system and the difficulty of managing and preventing
failures. Third, such systems often have high data rates and intensive processing re-
quirements, and there are frequently not enough system resources to replicate all this
data and processing to achieve high reliability. Fourth, information flows must have
negligible recovery times to limit losses to the enterprise. Finally, based on our experi-
ence working with industry partners like Delta Air Lines and Worldspan, systems must
recover not only from transient failures but also from non-transient ones (e.g., failures
that will recur unless some root cause is addressed) [14].
How can we provide high availability for information flows, given all of these re-
quirements? Traditional techniques such as recovery from disk-based logs [15] may
have recovery times that are unacceptable for the domain in question. Using active
replicas [26] imposes high communication and processing overheads (since all data
flow and processing is replicated) and therefore may not be an economically viable
option for the enterprise. Another option is to use an active-passive pair [26], where
a passive replica of an operator can be brought up to date by retransmitting messages
that had gone to the failed, active node. This option reduces communication costs,
since messages are only sent to the passive node at failure time. Unfortunately, this
means that the recovery time might be quite long. The ideal solution would be some
hybrid of the above approaches, since we might be willing to spend more processing
and communication during normal operation if it minimized recovery time.
We extend the active-passive approach to allow us to tune the tradeoff between
normal operation cost and recovery time. In particular, the passive replica will be
periodically refreshed with “soft-checkpoints:” these checkpoints transfer the current
state from the active node to the passive node, but are not required for correctness
(hence, they are “soft”). If the passive replica has been recently brought up to date
by a soft-checkpoint, the recovery will be relatively fast. By changing the frequency
at which soft-checkpoints are transmitted during normal operation, we can tune the
tradeoff between cost and recovery time.
In this paper, we propose self-adaptive techniques for tuning the soft-checkpoint
interval (and hence the cost/recovery time tradeoff). These techniques manage the
availability of multiple information flows in order to achieve the highest overall value
for the enterprise. Our system provides:
• Availability-Aware Self-Configuration – a user-supplied per information flow ‘benefit-
function’ drives the assignment of the resources required to guarantee availability.
This ensures preferential treatment of flows that offer more benefit to the enterprise,

































Figure 1: Information Flow-Graph and Operator State
• Proactive Availability-Management – during its execution, a system may be at dif-
ferent levels of stability (e.g., a heavy memory load could mean an imminent fail-
ure). In many cases, the “current stability” of the system can be quantified in order
increase or decrease the resources expended to ensure desired levels of availability.
• Handling Non-Transient Failures – Some failures will recur if the same sequence
of messages that caused the failure is resent during recovery. In this case, we must
use application-level knowledge to avoid fault recurrence. We present generic tech-
niques, based on real-world case studies, to deal with such faults.
Our techniques have been integrated into IFLOW, a high performance information
flow middleware we have previously developed [20, 21], to provide a coherent infras-
tructure for managing the availability of large-scale information flows. Experimen-
tally, we show that proactive availability-management imposes low additional com-
munication and processing overheads. Experiments with IFLOW deployed on Emu-
lab [22] also demonstrate the effectiveness of proactive fault tolerance in recovering
from failures, in offering a low recovery time of 2.5 seconds for a representative em-
ulated enterprise-scale information flow, while simultaneously, offering 1.5 times the
net-utility when compared to the active replica approach. In contrast to our previous
work on IFLOW, this paper focuses on utility-driven fault tolerance, using IFLOW as
the means to realize and experiment with the concept.
1.1 Example: Operational Information System
An operational information system (OIS) [14] is a large-scale, distributed system that
provides continuous support for a company or organization’s daily operations. One ex-
ample of such a system we have been studying is the OIS run by Delta Air Lines, which
provides the company with up-to-date information about all of their flight operations,
including crews, passengers and baggage. Delta’s OIS combines three different sets of
functionality:
• Continuous data capture - for information like crew dispositions, passengers, air-
planes and their current locations determined from FAA radar data.
• Continuous status updates - for low-end devices like airport flight displays, for the
PCs used by gate agents, and even for large databases in which operational state
changes are recorded for logging purposes.
• Responses to client requests - an OIS must also respond to explicit client requests
such as pulling up information regarding a particular passenger and may also gen-
erate additional updates for events such as changes in flights, crews or passengers.
In this paper, we model the information acquisition, manipulation and dissemina-
tion done by the OIS as an information-flow graph (an example flow-graph is shown
in Figure 1). We then present techniques, based on this flow-graph formalization, to
proactively manage the availability of the operational information system such that
the net-utility achieved by the system is maximized. This is done by assigning per
information-flow availability guarantees that are aligned with the benefit that is derived
from the information flow, and by proactively responding to the perceived changes
in system stability. We also present additional techniques, based on real-world case
studies, that can help a system recover from non-transient failures.
2 System Overview
This section describes a formal model of the information flows under consideration,
and the fault model used for the proactive availability-management technique explained
later.
2.1 Information Flow Model
An information flow is represented as a directed acyclic graph G(Vg, Eg, Unet) with
each vertex in Vg representing an information-source, an information-sink or a flow-
operator that processes the information i.e. Vg = Vsources∪Vsinks∪Voperators. Edges
Eg in the graph represent the flow of information, and may span multiple intermediate
edges and nodes in the underlying network. Finally, the utility-function Unet is defined
as:
Unet = Benefit− Cost (1)
Both benefit and cost are expressed in terms of some unit of value delivered per unit
time (e.g., dollars/second). Benefit is a user-supplied function that maps the delay,
availability, etc. of the information flow to its corresponding value to the enterprise.
Cost is also a user-supplied function, and maps resources such as CPU usage and band-
width consumed to expense incurred by the enterprise. We will expand the terms of
this seemingly simple equation in upcoming sections.
2.2 Fault Model
We are concerned with failures of the information flow that occur after it has been de-
ployed. In particular, we focus on fail-stop failures of operators that process events.
Such failures could result from problems in the operator code or in the underlying
physical node. Other factors might also cause failures, but are not considered here, in-
cluding problems with sources, problems with the sink, or link failures between nodes.
While such issues can cause user-perceived failures, they are outside the control of our
middleware and thus, must be addressed using other techniques. For example, link
failures could be managed by retransmission or re-routing at the network level.
For the purpose of recovering from a fault, we assume that each flow-operator
consists of a static-state Sstatic, that contains the information about the edges con-
nected to the operator and the enterprise logic embedded in the operator; in contrast,
the dynamic-state Sdynamic, is the information that is a result of all the updates that
have been processed by this operator (shown in Figure 1). Recovery therefore is de-
pendent upon the correct retrieval of the states Sstatic and Sdynamic, which together
contain the information necessary for re-instantiation of flow-operator and information
flow edges. However, as we describe next, simply recovering these states may not
prevent the recurrence of a failure.
2.2.1 Transient Faults
A fault can be caused by a condition that is transient in nature (e.g., a memory overload
due to a mis-behaving process), and such faults will not recur once the system starts
again after a recovery. A transient fault in our formalization would cause the failure of
an operator, and correct retrieval of the two states associated with the operator would
ensure permanent recovery from this fault. The techniques proposed in this paper are
capable of effectively handling a fault of this nature.
2.2.2 Non-Transient Faults
Non-transient faults are generally caused by some bug in the code, or due to some
unhandled conditions. For information flows, this would mean recurrence of the fault
even after recovery, if the same sequence of messages that caused the fault are sim-
ply repeated. To deal with faults of this nature, we note that the output produced by
a flow-operator in response to an input event E, depends on the existing dynamic-
state Sdynamic, the operator logic encoded as Sstatic, and the event E itself. There-
fore, the failure of an operator on arrival of an event E, is a result of three tuple
< Sdynamic, Sstatic, E >. Thus, any technique that aims to deal with non-transient
failures must have application-level hooks with which to retrieve and appropriately
modify this 3-tuple. Our prior work presents some examples of such hooks [14].
3 Utility-Driven Proactive Availability-Management
Traditional techniques for availability-management typically rely on undo-redo logs,
active-replicas, or an active-passive pair. A new set of problems is presented by in-
formation flows that form the backbone of an enterprise. For instance, using tradi-
tional on-disk undo-redo logs for information flows would lead to unacceptable recov-
ery times for the enterprise domain in face of machine or disk failures. The other end
of the availability-management spectrum, which uses active replicas, would impose
large additional communication and processing overheads due to the high arrival rate
of updates, making it economically infeasible for the enterprise to entertain this op-
tion. In response, researchers have customized the active-passive pair algorithm [26]
for enterprise-scale information-flows. This customization uses our novel notion of
‘soft-checkpoints’, first presented in [32], to reduce communication and processing
overheads. The basic method and its customization are described next.
3.1 Basic Active-Passive Pair Algorithm
To ensure high-availability for the flow-operator, in its simplest form, the active-passive
pair replication requires: a passive node containing the static-state Sstatic of the flow-
operator hosted on the active node, an event log at the flow-graph vertices directly
upstream to the flow-operator in question, a mechanism to detect duplicates at the
vertices directly downstream to the flow-operator, and a failure detection mechanism
for the active node hosting the primary flow-operator.
In case of a failure, recovery proceeds as follows: the failure detection mechanism
detects the failure and reports the same to the passive node. On receipt of the fail-
ure message, the passive node instantiates the flow-operator, making use of the static-
state Sstatic, already available at the node. The instantiated operator then contacts
the upstream vertices for re-transmission of the events in their event log. The newly
instantiated operator node processes these re-transmitted events in a normal fashion,
generating output events, and leaving it to the downstream nodes to detect the result-
ing duplicates. Once the re-transmission of the event log has been completed, the
resulting dynamic-state, Sdynamic, will be recovered to the state of the failed operator,
and normal operations can resume. Unfortunately, this simple algorithm can lead to
high recovery times, large event logs at the upstream nodes, and large associated re-
transmission costs. The remedy to these problems is the ‘soft-checkpoint’ technique,
described next.
The event logs at the upstream nodes and their re-transmission to the recovered
operator are required for reconstructing the dynamic-state Sdynamic, of the failed oper-
ator. However, in practice, it is advantageous to retain additional stable state at the pas-
sive node in order to avoid the need to re-transmit the entire event log. Such state saving
is called soft-checkpointing, because it is not needed for correctness. Soft checkpoints
can be updated on an intermittent basis in the background. Once taken, the compo-
nent receiving the checkpoint no longer requires the events on which the state depends
for reconstructing Sdynamic. This in turn permits upstream nodes to discard the event
logs for which the soft-checkpoint has been taken. Soft-checkpointing, therefore, is an
optimization that reduces the worst-case recovery time and permits the reclamation of
logs.
The introduction of soft-checkpoints requires small modifications to the recovery
mechanism described earlier in this section. The flow-operator at the active node in
the duration prior to failure would intermittently send messages to the passive node
that contain information about the incremental change to its dynamic-state since the
last message. The passive node, after the receipt of complete state update message
from the active node, applies the incremental modifications to the state it holds and
sends a message to the flow-operator’s upstream neighbors about the most recent event
contained in the message from the active node. The upstream nodes can use such in-
formation to purge their event logs. In case of a failure, the algorithm proceeds exactly
as described earlier, but only a small fraction of the events need to be re-transmitted
and processed.
3.2 Availability-Utility Formulation
In this section, we use a basic availability formulation to better describe the effects
and trade-offs in soft-checkpoint-based active-passive replication. Availability AI is






As stated earlier, our approach contributes to a reduction in recovery time and also
reduces the processing and communication overhead imposed as a result of ensuring a
certain level of availability. The reduction in recovery time results in lower MTTR, the
reduction in associated overheads diminishes cost, and both together result in higher
net-utility Unet, which is the actual utility provided by the system.
With our approach, MTTR depends on two factors: (1) the time to detect a failure,
and (2) the time to reconstruct the dynamic-state of the operator. Failure detection
mechanisms generally rely on time-outs to detect failures and therefore, depend on
the coarseness of the timer used for this purpose. Some research in the domain of
fault-tolerance has focused on multi-resolution timeouts [30], but to simplify analysis,
henceforth, we assume that the time to detect a failure is a constant. The second factor
contributing to MTTR depends on the soft-checkpoint algorithm. Specifically, a higher
frequency fcp, expressed in per unit time, of such checkpoints would lead to a smaller




For simplicity, we next derive the availability-utility formulation for a single infor-
mation flow (self-configuration across multiple information flows is addressed in Sec-
tion 3.3), and we assume that the Benefit and Cost depend only on availability. In





The above formulation may lead one to believe that a higher fcp is good for the system.
Unfortunately, a higher fcp also means more cost to propagate checkpoints from the
active node to the passive node. Therefore:
Cost ∝ fcp (5)
Note that a higher fcp also results in fewer events retransmitted during recovery; how-
ever, for large values of MTBF this effect is minor compared to the effects described
above (increase in benefit due to better availability, and increase in cost due to a higher
frequency of checkpoints). Experiments reported in Section 5.2.4 study the effects of
soft-checkpoint frequency on cost and availability of the information flow.





− k3 × fcp (6)
This equation expresses the key insight that net-utility depends not only on MTBF,
but also on the soft-checkpoint frequency used in a system, the latter both positively
contributing to net-utility (by reducing the denominator) and directly reducing net-
utility (by increasing the term being subtracted). Intuitively, this means that frequent
checkpointing can improve utility by reducing MTBF, but that it can also reduce utility
by using resources that would otherwise directly benefit the information-flow.
3.3 Availability-Aware Self-Configuration
Ideally, we would like to maximize the availability of an information flow, but given
that there is an associated cost, our actual goal is to choose a value of availability that
maximizes its net-utility. In our algorithm and its mathematical formulation fcp is the
factor that governs availability. By setting the derivative of equation 6 equal to zero,
we find that the value of fcp that maximizes net-utility is:

























In the presence of multiple information flows, each with a different benefit-function,
the resource assignment for availability is driven by the need to maximize net-utility
across all deployed information flows. Total net-utility of the entire system, then, is the
sum of individual net-utilities of information flows. For a system with n information
flows, we will need to calculate {f1cp, f2cp, ..., fncp}, which will automatically determine
resource assignments. The value of fcp for each information flow can be calculated
using partial differentials, and the involved calculations are omitted due to space con-
straints.
3.4 Proactive Availability-Management
We have established that net-utility depends on checkpoint frequency and MTBF. How-
ever, the MTBF in a real system is not a constant. Instead, the rate of failures fluctuates,
with more failures occurring when the system is in an unstable state. For example, dur-
ing periods of extreme overload, the system is likely to experience many component
failures. If we can better approximate the current MTBF, and in particular predict when
there will be many failures, we can make better decisions about checkpointing, increas-
ing the checkpoint rate when the current MTBF is low (and failures are imminent.)
3.4.1 Failure prediction
An effective way to estimate the current MTBF is to use failure prediction techniques to
generate ’early alarms’ when a failure seems to be imminent. By using failure predic-
tion methods, our approach can be ‘better prepared’ for an imminent failure, by taking
more frequent soft-checkpoints. Analysis logs provided to us by one of our industry
partners strengthens our belief in the usefulness of dynamic failure prediction. These
logs contain error messages and warnings that were recorded at a middleware broker
over a period of 7 days, along with their time-stamps. Figure 2 shows the distribu-
tion and severity of errors recorded at the broker node. One interesting observation of
these logs is that errors recur at almost the same time (around 9:00am as read from the
log time-stamp) beginning from the 2nd day. Another interesting observation about the
same set of logs is that 128 errors of severity level one occurred from 7:30pm in the first
day before a series of level four errors occurred from 8pm. Based on such logs, it would
be reasonable, therefore, to assume lower MTBF (i.e., predict imminent failures) for
the 9am time period and the period when large number of less severe errors occur, than
for other time periods in which this application executes. We note that similar time- or
load-dependent behaviors have been observed for other distributed applications.
We implemented the Sequential Probability Ratio Test used in MSET [34] failure
prediction method. The sequential probability ratio test is a run-time statistical hy-
pothesis test which can detect statistical changes in noisy process signals at the earliest
possible time, e.g., before the process crashes, or severe service degradation occurs. As
compared with normal threshold test, SPRT is capable of detecting failures much ear-
lier than threshold test could. Meanwhile, as compared with standard fixed sample test
in which a given number of observations are used to select one hypothesis from several
alternative hypotheses, SPRT is capable of analyzing process observations sequentially
at run-time and determine whether it has sufficient information to ensure pre-specified
confidence bounds are met and if so, it can determine immediately whether or not the
monitored process is consistent with normal behavior. SPRT has been applied success-
fully to the nuclear power plant on-line monitoring problem, and recently is been used
for software aging problems, e.g., database lath contention problem, memory leak, un-
released file locks, and data corruption etc, with the benefits outlined above and also
its high capability of achieving high sensitivity for subtle anomaly detection without
increasing false alarm probability.
The SPRT method works in the following ways. During the initialization, user
specifies the required false-alarm probability, missed-alarm probability, and the sys-
tem disturbance magnitude. SPRT is trained during system normal operating period,
so SPRT can learn the process signals which represent the usual operating state of
the system. The duration of the training phase is relatively short, of the magnitude
of several seconds to minutes, depending on the frequency of the signal. During the
monitoring phase, SPRT records a sequence of the monitored signal and analyzes the
signal with four hypothesis tests, the positive mean test H1, the negative mean test H2,
the normal variance test H3, and the inverse variance test H4. Each test generates a
SPRT index, which is compared to an upper limit and an lower limit(derived directly
from the specified false-alarm probability and missed-alarm probability). If the lower
limit is reached, the process is declared healthy, the test statistic is reset to zero(the
previously recorded sequence of signal can be discarded now), and sampling contin-
ues. If the upper limit is reached, the process is declared degraded, an alarm is raised
indicating process failure, the test statistic is reset to zero and sampling continues. If
the neither of two the limits is reached, no decision can be made and the sampling con-
tinues. Readers who are interested in the mathematical formulations and other details,
can refer to [16] for more details, and refer to [34] for variations of SPRT method.
Figure 3 illustrates how SPRT can detect memory leak faults before the memory
leak causes significant problem( slow response to no response from the process because
of out of memory). Memory leak faults are injected at time t = 10Sec. Using heart-
beat based failure detection, such kind of faults can only be detected when the all the
memory is used up and the service degrades dramatically or the process crashes. In
this example the service degrades dramatically at time t = 45Sec. However, SPRT is
able to raise alarms starting from t = 13.1Sec. Such kind of early warning capability
is reported in other literatures. For example, the eCMTM system [6] reports early
warning is raised from 5 minutes to 2 hours prior to database shared-memory-pool


































Figure 3: SPRT alarms for memory leak fail-
ures
































Figure 4: SPRT alarms for a synthesized
noisy signal
latch contention failures. Figure 4 represents a more general and noisy signal studied
in [16], in which linear service degradation starts from t = 40Sec. SPRT starts to
raise alarms from time t = 45Sec. Note that simple threshold test can only detect this
degradation much later.
One thing to note is that it is common sense that no failure prediction algorithm
will work for all possible system failures [11], and the prediction accuracy could vary
depending the algorithm and many other factors. One evidence is, although MSET and
its SPRT can raise early alarms effectively in previous cases, there are situations in
which false alarms are raised, or the internal fault causes the process failure or system-
wide failure immediately and early alarm is almost impossible. For example, we use
FIMD [3] software to inject software failures including timing delay, omission, mes-
sage corruption datatype, message corruption length, message corruption destination,
message corruption tag, message corruption data, memory leak, and invalid memory
access. The invalid memory access normally cause process crash immediately and
leaves almost no possibility for failure prediction/early alarm. Message corruption
data fault sometimes would cause change in the input/output signal, while sometimes
will not, depending on the internal service logic. In the latter case, no early alarm can
be raised.
While there are several researchers working on improving the failure prediction
mechanism, the focus of this paper is not to improve certain prediction algorithm, but
rather to study if current prediction methods could help to improve the system avail-
ability, how the system could use such kind of prediction methods and also the accuracy
requirement for the prediction algorithm to make it effective. Later we will also show
that while the current prediction methods don’t necessary provide very high accuracy
for every kinds of failures, they do can help to achieve high availability, if proactive
replication is ‘regulated’ in proper ways based on the prediction accuracy and replica-
tion cost etc. Meanwhile, interestingly enough, there are factors playing more impor-
tant role in such kind of proactive system, which must be considered carefully to make
early alarms really effective for enterprise-scale distributed systems.
3.4.2 Modulating the checkpoint frequency
The simple idea behind proactive availability-management is to use failure prediction
to modulate fcp; if a prediction turns out to be correct, the system ‘benefits’ because
of reduced MTTR; if a prediction turns out to be a false-positive, the system still
operates correctly, but it pays the ‘cost’ due to increased fcp. Stated more formally, let:
α = prediction false–positive rate
β = prediction false–negative rate
f ′cp = modulated checkpoint frequency after a failure is predicted
Tproactive = duration of increased checkpoint frequency
k = timeout after which an operator is concluded to be failed
Earlier, Cost was shown to be proportional to soft-checkpoint frequency. The new





This increased cost is incurred for a duration equal to Tproactive, and it is incurred each




− 1)× Cost× Tproactive (9)
The increase in fcp also affects the availability of the systems and therefore, the
benefit, Benefit′ derived from the system. Using equation 4, we have:
Benefit′ =
MTBF + k1/f ′cp
MTBF + k1/fcp
×Benefit (10)
Therefore, the increase in benefit due to a correct prediction that affects a period equal
to MTBF , is:
δBenefit = (Benefit′ −Benefit)×MTBF (11)
Since λ is the fraction of false-positives and because there is no increase in benefit
due to a false positive, the following condition expresses when proactive availability-
management based on failure prediction is beneficial for an entire system:
δCost < (1− α)× δBenefit (12)
Different systems could have different types and formulations of benefit and cost,
and this analysis provides the most important insight and guideline. For the enterprise
information flow system targeted by this paper, the proactive availability-management
problem can be formulated in more details as followings. Proactive availability-management
regulates the checkpoint frequency based on the stability predictions to minimize the
total cost which in turn maximizes the net business utility. To simplify the analysis,
the total cost here includes the cost of checkpointing and the utility loss because of the
failure(i.e. the extra utility the system could offer if there is no failure), so the problem
of maximizing net-utility is converted to the problem of minimizing the total cost. The
total cost Cost associated with proactive availability-management includes the cost of
checkpoints Costcp, cost due to false-positive failure prediction(failure predictor raises
a false alarm) Costfp, cost due to false-negative failure prediction(a failure is not pre-
dicted successfully) Costfn, and finally the cost associated with failure recovery when
a failure is successfully predicted Costps.
The cost of checkpoints Costcp is given by:
Costcp = (1− P (1− β + α))fcpC1, (13)
where C1 is the cost for each checkpoint update(e.g., the communication cost), and P
is the possibility an operator could fail from any time t to t+1(second). In this equation,
P (1 − β + α) is the fraction of one unit time when the checkpoint frequency is f ′cp,
due to correct failure predictions and false-positive predictions(false alarms).
The cost due to false-positive failure prediction is:
Costfp = αPf ′cptoC1, (14)
where to is the average time a predictor can raise an early alarm for a severe failure
before the failure actually causes the operator down.








where C2 is the cost to recover the state update happened every unit time in the active
operator. The first term is the cost for the passive node to recover from the last check
pointed Sstatic to the S′static when the failure occurred. The second term is the loss of
utility when the system recover from this failure. In other words, this term represents
the utility the system could provide if there is no such a failure.
The cost associated with failure recovery when a failure is successfully predicted,
Costps, is determined in a similar manner stated above:





)C3 + f ′cpt0C1]. (16)
And the total cost is:
Cost = Costcp + Costfp + Costfn + Costps. (17)
To regulate the checkpoint frequency, proactive fault tolerance finds the best check-
point frequency fcp when there is no failure predicted and the checkpoint frequency f
′
cp
after failure is predicted, by minimizing the above formula.
Often, enterprises also has specific requirement of system availability. For example,
a 365 x 24 system with maximum average downtime of 8.76 hours(525 minutes) per
year requires 99.9 percent availability, while a system with only 3 minutes of service
outrage must have at least 99.999 percent availability. Achieve such kind of availability
is difficult due to the extremely high cost of fault tolerance services and equipments.
Proactive availability-management strikes a good balance between these two factors by
the process stated in the followings.



































Proactive fault tolerance meets the minimum availability requirement and mean-
while maximize the net utility by solving the problem













(1− β)] ≥ ArequiredI . (19)
Normally, the utility function(net-utility) is a business-level specification, thus could
vary in different enterprises. In Section 5.1, we also show experimental results with
different utility function specification which is similar to the utility function in [21] to
demonstrate the genrality and effectiveness of our approach.
3.5 Handling Non-Transient Faults
Non-transient failures are a result of bugs or unhandled conditions in operator code.
Traditional techniques for ensuring high-availability that use undo/redo logs [15, 32]
are useful when failures are caused by transient conditions. Using such techniques for
non-transient failures would result in recurrence of faults during recovery. The same
applies to replication-based approaches [2], in which all replicas fail simultaneously in
face of non-transient faults.
As described in Section 2.2.2, a non-transient failure of the information flow in our
model is a result of the three tuple < Sstatic, Sdynamic, E >. The active-passive pair
approach for ensuring high-availability has enough information during the recovery to
change this three tuple. The passive-node during recovery has access to Sstatic, a stale
state S′dynamic and a set of updates T from the upstream nodes that when applied to
S′dynamic would lead to Sdynamic. The rationale behind our approach to avoid non-
transient failures is simple: avoid the three tuple that caused the failure. This can be
done in a number of ways, and the retransmitted updates T along with the application-
level knowledge hold the key:
• Dropping Updates: the simplest solution to avoid recurrence of a fault is to avoid
processing the update that caused the failure. Our earlier work on ‘poison mes-
sages’ used this technique [14].
• Update Reordering: changing the order in which updates are applied to S′dynamic
during recovery can avoid Sdynamic. This makes use of application-level knowl-
edge to ensure correctness.
• Update Fusion: combining updates to avoid an intermediate state could be an op-
tion. A simple example of this approach could be the use of this technique to avoid
‘division by zero’ error.
• Update Decomposition: decomposing an update into a number of equivalent up-
dates can be an option with several applications, and this can potentially avoid the
fault.
While seemingly simple, the techniques described above are often successful in
realistic settings. For example, one of our collaborators, Delta Airlines serving the
Atlanta region, reported an occasional surge in the usage of resources connected to their
Operational Information System (OIS) [23] that traced back to a particular uncommon
message type. The resulting performance hit caused other subsystem’s requests to
build up, including those from the front ends used by clients, ultimately threatening
operational failure (e.g., inappropriately long response times) or revenue loss (e.g.,
clients going to alternate sites). Such uncommon request/message termed as ‘Poison
Messages’ were later found to be identifiable by certain characteristics. The solution
then adopted was to either drop or re-route the poison message in order to maintain
operational integrity.
4 Middleware Implementation
IFLOW [20, 21] is an information flow middleware developed at Georgia Tech. IFLOW
implements the information flow abstraction of Section 2.1 and provides methods to de-
ploy and then optimize (by migrating operators) the information flow. For more details
please refer to [28].
We now briefly describe the features that enable proactive availability-management
in the IFLOW middleware. These features are implemented both at the control plane
and the data plane of this middleware infrastructure, and are described next.
4.1 Control Plane
The control plane in IFLOW is responsible for self-management of the information
flow. This involves running a self-configuration and a self-optimization algorithm, car-
ried out by exchange of control messages between physical nodes that are external to
the data fast paths used to transport IFLOW data. Control actions involve operations
like flow-control, operator re-instantiation, etc. The main features of the IFLOW con-
trol plane that are required for proactive fault tolerance are described below:
• Availability-aware self-configuration module: the benefit-formulation in IFLOW
allows for availability goals to be specified, and determines the best value of fcp by
using the formulation described in Section 3.2.
• Failure detection & prediction: IFLOW attempts to use the regular traffic from a
node to determine its liveness, but it switches to specific detection messages if there
is no regular traffic from the node to the monitoring node. We also have a provision
for multi-resolution timeouts to reduce the load imposed by the failure detection
algorithm. Finally, state can be maintained to use failure history for predicting
failures, but we have not yet implemented any specific technique into IFLOW.
• Control messages: SOAP calls are used to notify active-node failure, to communi-
cate log purge points to upstream vertices, etc.
• Update re-direction in case of failure: a simple control mechanism exists at the
upstream vertices to re-direct updates to the passive node in case of failure. The
connection between upstream vertices and the passive node is created at the time
of flow deployment.
4.2 Data Plane
A fast data-path is one of the key design philosophies of the IFLOW middleware. We
have taken care that the features required for proactive availability-management have
minimal impact on the data-path. In order to ensure proactive availability-management,
the state of an operator on the data plane needs to be soft-checkpointed and the changes
need to be periodically communicated to the passive-node. The fact that a soft-checkpoint
is not necessary for correctness of proactive availability-management ensures minimal
impact on the data-path. Specifically, the active-node can transfer the soft-checkpoint
to the passive node asynchronously (e.g., when load is low), and this will not com-
promise the correctness of our algorithm. The specific feature required for proactive
availability-management are described below:
• Logging at upstream vertices: any update that is sent out from the source ver-
tex is logged to enable retransmission in case of failure. Additional logs can be
established at intermediate nodes (an operator vertex is a source for downstream
vertices) to enable faster recovery. The log module also implements a mechanism
to purge the log when a message is received from the downstream node after a
soft-checkpoint is completed.
• Soft-checkpoint module at operator vertices: the soft-checkpoint module tracks
the changes in Sdynamic since the last soft-checkpoint. It is also responsible for
sending soft-checkpoints to the passive node.
• Duplicate detection at the downstream node: the duplicate detection mechanism is
based on the monotonic update system proposed in our earlier work [32]. When
the updates cannot be ordered using the contained attributes, a monotonically in-
creasing attribute (e.g., the real-time clock) is appended to the out-going update
that uniquely identifies this update.
• Additional edge between active-passive pair: a supplementary data-flow between
the active-passive pair delivers the soft-checkpoints to the passive vertex.
• Maintaining checkpoints at passive-node: the passive vertex contains the logic that
applies an incoming soft-checkpoint to the recorded active node state.
5 Experiments
Experiments are designed to evaluate the performance our proactive availability-management
techniques. First, simulations are used to better understand the behavior of the self-
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Figure 5: Sample testbed. The testbed topology is generated using GT-ITM and is configured
at emulab facility.
Table 1: Self-Determining Availability based on Benefit
Optimization Criterion Utility Cost Delay
Net-Utility (dollars/sec) 431991 52670 2160
Cost (dollars/sec) 79875 14771 80315
Delay (msec) 222 444 191
fcp (sec−1) 0.050 0.018 0.020
Availability (percent) 99.88 99.66 99.70
supplied benefit function. Next, an end-to-end setup is created on Emulab [22], rep-
resenting an enterprise-scale information flow to compare our approach against the
traditional approaches and to study the effect of different soft-checkpoint intervals and
proactivity on aspects like MTTR, recovery cost, and net-utility. Results show that
proactive availability-management is effective at providing a low-cost failure resilience
for information-flow applications while also maximizing the application’s net-utility.
5.1 Simulation Study
We conducted a simulation study to compare our utility-based availability management
to simple approaches that are not availability-aware. The simulation made use of a 128
node topology generated using GT-ITM internetwork topology generator [35]. We use
the formulation of net-utility Unet in which the benefit is determined as: benefit =
k1 × (k2 − delay)2 × availability × availableBandwidth/requiredBandwidth,
and the cost is calculated as: cost = dataRate× bandwidthCostPerByte. Random
costs are assigned to the network links, expressed in dollars per byte. We substitute
(k1 = 1.0, k2 = 150.0) in the benefit formulation for the following simulation [21].
The MTBF was assumed to be 86400sec. and the MTTR was assumed to be 864sec.
for a fcp value of 0.01Hz. We first deployed the flow-graph using the net-utility specifi-
cation from equation 1 as the optimization criteria and the results are shown in Table 1
under the column labeled ‘Utility’. The results show a high achieved net-utility with
acceptable values for delay, fcp and availability. The second deployment (under ‘Cost’)
focused instead on minimizing the cost, and used 1/cost as the optimization criteria.

























(a) Active and passive approach(various inter-
vals)























(b) Proactive, active, and passive
approach(interval = 2s, 5s)
Figure 6: Net utility rate variations using active, passive or proactive fault tolerance ap-
proaches. A failure is injected into one operator node at the time t = 40s.
The effect of choosing a different criteria is evident in the reduced cost, achieved by
allowing a higher delay and a lower availability (resulting from lower fcp). The final
deployment uses 1/delay to drive the deployment, as a result a reduction in delay is
achieved for the flow-graph but at the expense of net-utility and availability.
5.2 Testbed Experiments using IFLOW
This set of experiments is conducted on Emulab [22], and the network topology is
again generated using the GT-ITM internetwork topology generator. In many cases,
enterprises would hand tune their topology for availability and performance, instead of
using an arbitrary topology. For example, an enterprise may explicitly designate a pri-
mary and secondary data center. We use an arbitrary topology in our experiments so we
can see how well our techniques perform without the benefit of additional hand tuning.
Figure 5 shows the testbed used for our experimental evaluations. Background traffic is
generated using cmu-scen-gen [25], injected into the testbed using rate-controlled udp
connections. For the testbed depicted in Figure 5, background traffic is composed of
900 CBR connections. We use the utility formulation in Equation 19, to better study the
net-utility and the cost associated with checkpointing and failures. Required availabity
is 99.9
5.2.1 Variation of Net-Utility for Different Approaches
The first experiment studies the variation of net-utility with different availability-management
approaches in the presence of failures. For simplicity, only one failure is injected into
the system. We conduct experiments with the active replication approach, the passive
replication approach with varying soft-checkpoint intervals, and the proactive repli-
cation approach. Figure 6 clearly demonstrates that the active replication approach
provides the lowest net-utility. This is because of the high amount of replicated com-
munication traffic when using this approach. After a failure, the net-utility of the active
approach increases slightly; there is less replication traffic, which is a large cost in our
utility function, because the failed node no longer sends replicated output updates. The
experiment also corroborates the analysis in Section 3.2: a lower soft-checkpoint in-
terval for the passive approach imposes higher communication cost on the system and
therefore, results in lower net-utility. Note that if availability were a predominant factor
in our net-utility formulation, then a lower soft-checkpoint interval could have resulted
in higher net-utility. The cost of soft-checkpoints is almost negligible when the interval



























Figure 7: MTTR and standard deviation of
recovery time under three replication strate-












































Total Cost during Recovery
Figure 8: Utility rate and total cost to re-
cover from one failure. For each approach,
the left(solid) and right(shadow) bars represent
the average utility during failure recovery, and
before the failure. The curve with markers rep-
resents the total cost including business utility
loss during recovery from failure.
The proactive approach provides the highest net-utility overall, as it uses the per-
ceived system stability to modulate the soft-checkpoint interval. For instance, it switches
to a smaller soft-checkpoint interval just before the failure and is therefore able to re-
cover as fast as the passive approach with a 2 seconds update interval, while performing
as well as the passive approach with a 30 seconds update interval at other times. We
note that failure detection is not the focus of this paper. To investigate how prediction
accuracy affects the system, these experiments simulate a predictor for the proactive
approach, with failure prediction statistically generated at various levels of accuracy.
In particular, we notify the soft-checkpoint mechanism that a failure is imminent, no
matter whether the prediction is correct or a false positive. In an actual system, faults
would be predicted using some learning model (e.g., [10, 34]).
5.2.2 Variation of MTTR for Different Approaches
The variation of MTTR and its standard deviation with different approaches are shown
in Figure 7. For each approach, nine experiments are done to obtain the mean and
standard deviation. The active replication approach (not shown in the graph) has no
explicit recovery time. This is because the node downstream of the replicated opera-
tor continues to receive processed updates even after the failure of one active replica.
On the other hand, the passive replication approach which attempts to avoid the high
cost of active replication incurs recovery times that increase with the soft-checkpoint
interval. The reason for this increase is the time taken for reconstructing the operator
state: the higher the soft-checkpoint interval, the larger the number of updates required
to rebuild the state. Recovery time for the passive replication approach depends on the
soft-checkpoint interval. It ranges from 3.7 seconds (for a 2 second interval) to 14.8
seconds (for a 30 second interval). The proactive approach, as expected, performs well
as compared to other passive replication approaches, since it is able to change over to a
very small soft-checkpoint interval just before the failure, and hence, has low MTTR.
The experiment demonstrates the importance of choosing the right soft-checkpoint in-
terval automatically to maximize availability at low cost and thereby maximize the
net-utility of information flows.
5.2.3 Cost & Net-Utility During Recovery
The proactive availability-management approach increases soft-checkpoint activity when
a failure is predicted in the near future, but it maintains a low soft-checkpoint activity
at other times. The analysis of net-utility value before failure, during failure recovery,
and the total cost to recover from failure are summarized in Figure 8. The net-utility
using proactive availability-management is higher than any other approach, because it
contains a very recent soft-checkpoint for the operator state and therefore, incurs the
least cost during recovery. Note that passive replication with an interval of 2 seconds
also incurs a low cost during recovery, but this is achieved by losing non-negligible
net-utility at normal operation time.
5.2.4 Effects of Checkpoint Frequency and Prediction Accuracy on Cost and
Availability
The next experiment closely examines the effect of checkpoint frequency on the sys-
tem, both in terms of system availability and the cost imposed to gain a unit amount
of utility. As mentioned in Section 3.2, a higher fcp leads to a higher number of soft-
checkpoint messages from the active to the passive node, but it also leads to a smaller
number of updates being required to reconstruct the operator state during recovery. The
conflicting behavior of incurred cost due to fcp is represented in Figure 9 by the two
parabolic curves. Ideally, we would like to spend the minimum cost to achieve a unit
amount of utility and would therefore, like to choose a value of fcp that is located at the
dip of the parabolic curve. Note that the cost/utility ratio is consistently higher for the
passive vs. the proactive approach. We also show the effect of fcp on the availability of
the system: the change is in line with the formulation described in Equation 4. How-
ever, the interesting insight from this experiment is the direct correspondence between
the lowest achievable cost/utility and the flattening of the availability curve.
Our final experiments study the effect of prediction accuracy λ, on the achieved
cost/utility ratio. It is intuitive that better prediction accuracy would lead to lower
cost/utility for proactive availability-management, and this is clearly depicted in Fig-
ure 10. It is interesting to note the behavior of proactive availability-management with
a lower fcp value. When prediction accuracy is low, a small fcp leads to very high
recovery times with low net-utility during that period. However, if prediction accuracy
is high and fcp is modulated to handle such failures, recovery time decreases and a far
lower cost/utility is achieved. The effect of prediction accuracy is less prominent when
a higher value of fcp is used, as the recovery times don’t improve much, even with a
correct prediction.
6 Related Work
Traditional Fault-Tolerance. Redundancy is probably the earliest form of fault-tolerance;
the approach popularly known as the active replication approach is well-studied, and a
thorough description appears in [26]. Log-based recovery is well-know in the database
domain. Here, a failure is handled with an undo-redo log [15]. Fault-tolerance has also
been studied in the context of transactions [5] and distributed systems [29]. A number
of factors distinguish our approach from these traditional mechanism, the first and the
foremost being its utility-awareness. Another distinction is our ability to use failure






























Figure 9: Effect of checkpoint frequency on
cost and availability. Checkpoint frequency
affects the cost (left y-axis) in a non-linear
way, and it is important to optimize it. Note
that there is also a sweet spot in the graph,
where cost is minimized and availability (right
y-axis) is also high. The proactive approach can
achieve the same level of availability with sig-
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Figure 10: Effect of prediction accuracy on
cost of ensuring availability. Better predic-
tion accuracy helps reduce the cost incurred for
ensuring high-availability, especially when the
checkpoint frequency is high (the curve with
the deepest slope). When checkpoint frequency
is sufficiently large (the four curves with fcp ≥
1Hz), lower accuracy has less effect on the cost
due to the fact that less time is required to re-
cover from an unpredicted failure.
Failure Detection & Prediction. [30] and [31] focus on the implementation of fault
detection, and [30] proposed a scalable fault detection/collection framework. More re-
cently, researchers in the autonomic domain have used statistical monitoring techniques
to detect failures in component-based Internet services [12, 19]. MSET or multi-variate
state estimation techniques [34] constitute an early warning system that enables fail-
ure prediction with low false alarm probability and has been successfully applied to
the thermal control domain, and more recently, to software aging problems, including
predicting memory leaks, data corruption, shared memory pool latching, etc. In [10],
instrumentation data is correlated to system states using statistical induction techniques
to identify system-level metrics that correlate with high-level performance states. In
addition, these techniques are used to forecast service level objective violations, with
prediction accuracy reported to be around 90%. Failure diagnosis has also been stud-
ied in the context of self-managing systems [7]; this could allow developers to embed
self-healing features into their systems. Our system provides a framework in which
several such failure detection and prediction techniques can be implemented to provide
high-availability while imposing a low-overhead.
Fault-Tolerant Distributed Information Systems. Stars [29] presents a fault-tolerance
manager for distributed application, using a distributed file manager which performs
actions like message backups and checkpoints storage for user files. Its reliance on
causal and atomic group multi-cast [27], however, demands additional solutions in the
context of today’s widely geographically distributed enterprise systems [8].
MTTR may be improved with solutions like Microreboot [4], which proposes a fast
recovery technique for large systems. It is based on the observation that a significant
fraction of software failures in large-scale Internet systems can be cured by rebooting.
While rebooting can be expensive and cause nontrivial service disruption, microreboot-
ing is a fine-grain technique for surgically recovering faulty application components,
without disturbing the rest of the components of the application. Our work could ben-
efit from such techniques.
IFLOW’s techniques may be directly compared to the fault-tolerance offered in
systems like Fault-Tolerant CORBA [17], Arjuna [24] and REL [13], which replicate
selected application/service objects. Multiple replicas allow an object to continue to
provide service even when one of its replicas fails. Passive replication is also pro-
vided. Here, the system records both the state of the currently executing member (pri-
mary member) and the entire sequence of method invocations. While CORBA focuses
on the client-server model of communication, recent systems like Borealis [2] and
SMILE [32] have focused on fault-tolerance for applications that process data streams.
The former uses replication-based fault-recovery, and the authors propose to trade con-
sistency for recovery time. The latter proposes the soft-checkpointing mechanism that
can be used to implement a low-overhead passive replication scheme for fault tolerance.
We differ from such earlier work because of our explicit consideration of system utility
for managing system availability, and because our system also provides a framework
for incorporating failure prediction techniques.
Utility-Functions. The specific notions of utility used in this paper mirror the
work presented in [33], which uses utility functions for autonomic data-centers. Au-
tonomic self-optimization according to business objectives is studied in [1], and self-
management of information flow applications in accordance with utility functions is
studied in [21]. A preliminary discussion about availability-aware self-configuration
in autonomic systems appears in [9]. Our middleware carefully integrates the ideas
from the above systems and other domains to build a comprehensive framework for
fault-tolerant information flows.
7 Conclusion
We have proposed techniques for managing the tradeoff between availability and cost
in information flow middleware. First, a net-utility-based formulation of the bene-
fits an enterprise derives from its information flows combines both performance and
reliability attributes of such flows. The goal is not simply to attain high utility, but
to reliably provide high utility to large-scale information flow applications. Second,
since reliability techniques incur costs thereby reducing utility, proactive methods for
availability-management take into account the fact that system and application behav-
iors change over time. A specific example is a higher likelihood of failure in high
load vs. low load conditions. Reliability costs, therefore, are reduced by exploiting
knowledge about the current ‘perceived’ system stability. Additional cost savings re-
sult from the use of failure prediction methods. Third, the implementation presented
in this paper can deal with both transient and non-transient failures, the latter relying
on application-specific techniques for fault avoidance. Finally, utility-driven proactive
availability-management technique has been integrated into a representative infrastruc-
ture for large-scale information flows, where it is shown to impose low additional com-
munication and processing overheads on information flows. Experimental results with
IFLOW attained on Emulab [22] demonstrate the effectiveness of proactive fault toler-
ance in recovering from failures.
Future work will experiment with richer failure prediction techniques, and it will
investigate realistic enterprise environments. We will model the redundant data-centers
mandated by government rules, and we will consider the attainment of high availability
and net-utility in information flows that cross multiple organizational boundaries.
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